In many ways, the abortion issue is similar to the animal rights issue. They are both among the most challenging questions for similar reasons. In each case, reasonable people disagree about how the 3L Legal Principle applies. Many reasonable people who conclude the 3L Legal Principle applies to the unborn baby disagree on the point at which it begins to apply. We cannot analyze whether someone violates the 3L Legal Principle until we first determine whether the 3L Legal Principle applies at all. Said another way, the question turns on whether the unborn baby, or fetus, owns itself. It is on this point that reasonable people disagree, which is precisely what makes these issues so complex.

Regardless of your opinion on this issue, we should recognize these are complex questions upon which thoughtful and reasonable people honestly disagree. There are no objectively correct answers about where to draw the lines on these complex issues. Science alone cannot resolve these questions. As such, rational people, each genuinely committed to correctly applying the 3L Legal Principle in good faith, can and do come to different reasonable conclusions on these issues. We should honestly acknowledge this fact.

It is too simple merely to assert it is a woman’s body; therefore, the pregnant woman should decide unilaterally whether to have an abortion. This conclusion is problematic because other reasonable people, while possibly fully acknowledging the pregnant woman owns her body, view the unborn fetus as an entirely separate and self-owning human body located inside the pregnant woman’s body. It is interesting to note that many people who make the “woman’s body” argument disingenuously abandon that same argument when discussing the issues of prostitution, drug use, and euthanasia.

It is also too simple to boldly claim the unborn fetus should be considered a person from the moment of conception and therefore entitled to the absolute protection of the 3L Legal Principle merely because it has unique DNA or for entirely religious-based reasons. Some people point out that dead skin cells and cut hair also contain unique DNA, but we do not afford personhood to those human cells either. Nor is the religious justification persuasive to others who subscribe to religions with different views or those who reject religion. It is interesting to note that those who offer this “sanctity of life” argument, even as applied to a two-celled “zygote,” often have no objection to hunting and killing adult, biologically complex, sentient, pain-feeling, non-human animals such as elk, deer, and pigs merely for “sport.”

In the case of abortion, the two-celled zygote is undeniably human. However, reasonable people genuinely committed to correctly applying the 3L Legal Principle in good faith argue that because the two-celled human is not conscious, feels no pain, and cannot reason at all, it should not be entitled to the protection of the 3L Legal Principle; at least not at that point in its development. Many people offer viability outside the womb as the relevant point at which the 3L Legal Principle correctly applies. However, it is unclear why this moving target, entirely subject to technological advancements, ought to be the proper dividing line.

As with the animal rights issue, many variables and complexities apply to the abortion issue such as the health of the pregnant woman, rape, and even the unborn baby’s health and expected quality of life. There are some things we can reasonably conclude about these specific issues. Regarding the health of the pregnant woman, we can resolve this issue with ordinary self-defense principles even if we consider the unborn fetus a self-owning human baby. In any case where one person substantially threatens another, if the threat is imminent, the threatened person is always legally entitled to utilize the least amount of force necessary to terminate that threat. If terminating the life of the unborn baby is the least amount of force necessary to prevent a substantial injury or death to the pregnant woman, then the pregnant woman, like any other person in such a situation, is entitled to take the life of the other person to defend herself. As such, legally disallowing abortion in a case where the unborn baby threatens a substantial injury or death to the pregnant woman should always be considered an unreasonable interpretation of the 3L Legal Principle as it would negate the basic right of self-defense. That said, exactly what factual circumstances satisfy these criteria is an area where reasonable minds may differ.

Similarly, in the case of rape, even if we consider the unborn fetus a self-owning human baby, legally prohibiting the pregnant woman from terminating the pregnancy should also always be considered an unreasonable interpretation of the 3L Legal Principle. The reason for this conclusion is that even if the unborn baby is a self-owning human, the involuntarily pregnant woman has done nothing to incur a legal duty to help or assist the self-owning unborn baby survive. While people may have moral duties to assist others in need of help, legal duties to assist others, even to survive, do not arise unless a person takes some action to put another person in the desperate situation. As an example, no person has a legal duty to rescue a stranger at risk of drowning. However, if that same person did something to put the stranger at risk of drowning, such as pushing the stranger in the water, then the person accrues a legal duty to take action to rescue the stranger. Obligating a woman who was involuntarily made pregnant to continue to assist even a self-owning unborn baby wrongly imports moral duties into the law. Forcing people to act morally, even to save the life of another person, always violates the 3L Legal Principle. That said, while rape certainly qualifies, exactly what other circumstances may amount to an involuntary pregnancy may also be an area where reasonable minds can disagree.

Finally, the specific issue of the unborn baby’s health and expected quality of life can be resolved the same way we analyze the euthanasia issue. It is important to note that this analysis requires the pregnant mother to exercise her judgment in good faith in the capacity of a fiduciary or guardian of the unborn baby and not for her own self-interested benefit. Even if we consider the unborn fetus a self-owning human baby, the baby does not possess the capacity to exercise its own judgment. For the same reason a competent adult, as the iron-fisted dictator and owner of his or her own life has a right to terminate it, the pregnant mother, as the fiduciary or guardian of the unborn baby has the right to exercise discretion to determine the baby’s life is not worth living. As with the other issues described above, reasonable minds can disagree upon how to determine whether the pregnant woman is acting in the capacity of a proper fiduciary or guardian for the unborn baby’s best interests.

It should be obvious that there are no objectively correct answers to many questions that touch the abortion issue. Reasonable minds, equally committed to the proper application of the 3L Legal Principle in good faith, honestly disagree. Said another way, there is more than one reasonable interpretation of how the 3L Legal Principle applies to the abortion issue. As was discussed in chapter six, analyzing some complex or challenging issues yields more than one reasonable conclusion. The abortion question is one such issue. What personal conclusion you or I come to on this issue is irrelevant. We both have our personal opinions and preferences about how to resolve this issue. Neither of us is entitled to have our interpretations of how the 3L Legal Principle applies to complex issues imported into the law and applied to everyone. We are only entitled to at least a reasonable interpretation of how the 3L Legal Principle applies, whether that comports with our interpretations or not. Perfection in the law or the world is not an available option. Rather than endlessly fight about the issue and seek a one-size-fits-all solution, we must resolve it to achieve freedom and peace.

As should always be the case when we encounter complex or challenging issues where reasonable people disagree about how the 3L Legal Principle applies, the local community, as in cities and towns, should select which reasonable interpretation to adopt in their local community. As was argued in chapter six, there are many different reasons why such an issue should be resolved at the local community level rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all approach applied to all members of the larger community. As local communities draft laws and rules implementing their selection of which reasonable interpretation to adopt, the market of people who live and trade there will adjust accordingly based on any reasons they prefer.

That said, if we think differently about the nature of abortion, reasonable people may be able to converge on the same interpretation, at least post-viability. Suppose current medical technology exists and is employed to voluntarily terminate a pregnancy while simultaneously sustaining the life of the unborn baby. We could more accurately refer to this procedure as an “eviction2” rather than an “abortion.” After such an eviction, the formerly pregnant woman, who would presumably have no further interest in the baby, certainly has no valid basis for insisting upon terminating the baby’s life.

Because the 3L Legal Principle certainly applies to babies after birth, intentionally terminating the evicted baby’s life would violate the 3L Legal Principle. As such, allowing a pregnant woman to terminate the pregnancy of a viable unborn baby under conditions where medical technology is employed to sustain the baby’s life should pose no legal issue because there is no violation of the 3L Legal Principle. Whether such an eviction procedure violates the 3L Moral Principle or any other person’s broader moral values is irrelevant to the analysis of how the 3L Legal Principle applies.

Employing the “eviction analysis” for post-viable unborn babies results in a win for the woman who no longer desires to be pregnant or to be a mother, a win for the unborn baby who is allowed to live life, and a win for any adoptive parents who desire a baby to raise as their own. It would be hard to conclude such a process is unethical. Other complicating issues remain, such as the biological father’s rights and sufficient funding to sustain the baby’s life if there are no willing adoptive parents or other people to voluntarily pay for the necessary sustaining medical care.

While viewing abortion as an eviction may resolve the issue of when the unborn baby is viable outside the womb, it does not resolve the issue pre-viability. However, this may be a temporary problem as science and technology advance. It is reasonable to expect that someday viability outside the womb will be possible from conception. On that day, we can resolve this entire issue by treating abortion as an eviction at any time during pregnancy. Until that day, subject to the specific issues described above, it is best to let local communities reasonably decide how the 3L Legal Principle applies to the issue of abortion generally.